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Abstract: Although the US credit crisis precipitated it, the Irish credit crisis is an 
identifiably separate one, which might have occurred in the absence of the U.S. crash. 
The distinctive differences between them are notable. Almost all the apparent causal 
factors of the U.S. crisis are missing in the Irish case; and the same applies vice-versa. 
At a deeper level, we identify four common features of the two credit crises: capital 
bonanzas, irrational exuberance, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. The 
particular manifestations of these four “deep” common features are quite different in 
the two cases.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper compares the two linked, but separate, credit crises in the U.S. and Ireland, 
explores the differences between them, and reaches some tentative conclusions about 
the “deep” common features which caused them. The two crises are interesting 
theoretically since, although they occurred near-simultaneously in two closely linked 
economies, from a superficial perspective they are quite different. The two main 
building blocks for explaining the U.S. crisis, subprime mortgages and mortgage-
related securities, are almost entirely absent from the Irish capital market and from 
Irish financial institutions’ balance sheets. Three of the four main catalysts for the 
Irish crises are absent from the U.S. case: large net borrowing by the banking sector in 
foreign debt markets, stratospherically overpriced property markets, and very unsafe 
lending by the banking sector for speculative property development. A fourth catalyst 
was the knock-on effects of the U.S. liquidity-credit crisis, particularly its effect on 
the interbank borrowing market. The Irish credit environment was so precarious at the 
time of the U.S. crash that it is arguable that the Irish credit crisis would have 
occurred even in the absence of this fourth catalyst.  
 
We explore the differences between the two crises, and argue for four common 
“deep” causal factors in the periods leading up to the two crises. The first is irrational 
exuberance, and associated asset price bubbles. In both countries this irrational 
exuberance grew during unusually benign economic climates, the Great Moderation 
period in the USA and the Celtic Tiger period in Ireland. The second is very low real 
borrowing rates sustained by international capital inflows into both countries (but 
inflows of different types of capital). Reinhart and Reinhart (2008a) call this a capital 
bonanza and we follow their terminology. The third is regulatory imprudence in 
response to political pressure by special interests (but different types of political 
pressures serving different special interests in the two countries). The fourth is moral 
hazard behaviour by agents in the financial sector and (for Ireland) in the property 
development industry. The particular mechanisms by which these common features 
caused credit crises in the two countries are surprisingly different in the two cases.  
 
As noted by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), a distinguishing feature of financial 
crises is that they are all superficially different, at least from the most recently 
preceding ones, since economic agents are well-prepared for any set of circumstances 
clearly similar to those in recent past crises. This lack of obvious historical repetition 
makes social scientific analysis more subtle, since this type of analysis relies on 
historical sample data to build models that explain and forecast. Explaining a 
particular financial crisis on a superficial level will have little relevance for 
forecasting or preventing future ones. Hence it is important to work at a deeper level 
in the search for common features. Our case-study comparison of these two crises 
involves too small a sample to reach definitive conclusions, but we believe it is 
illuminating and worthwhile. At a minimum, comparison of these two crises may 
persuade researchers not to draw excessively general conclusions from superficial 
examination of the particular circumstances of the U.S. crisis alone. Another credit 
crisis occurred nearly simultaneously to the more prominent U.S. one, in an economy 
closely linked to the US economy, and yet the specific causal mechanisms for the 
crisis were very different. Given this, general conclusions from the particularities of 
the U.S. crisis are problematic.  
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In a series of papers and a book, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a,b; 2009) provide a 
comprehensive overview of financial crises across many countries and covering 
several centuries of financial history. Our paper is informed by the Reinhart and 
Rogoff research programme, and we use some of their taxonomy, but we compare 
these two crises with a finer level of granularity than their much broader coverage of 
global economic and financial history. Two of the four common features that we 
identify, capital bonanzas and irrational exuberance, appear prominently in the 
Reinhart and Rogoff analysis. The other two, regulatory imprudence and moral hazard, 
reflect the managerial, mixed-economy nature of both the US and Irish economies. In 
both cases, governmental and managerial errors played a key role in causing the crises, 
which would not be possible in the broad historical sample considered by Reinhart 
and Rogoff.  
 
Section 2 compares the U.S. credit-liquidity crisis and the subsequent Irish banking 
crisis highlighting the substantial, somewhat surprising, differences between them. 
Section 3 discusses the nationwide irrational exuberance, and associated asset price 
bubbles, evident with hindsight in both the US and Irish economies in the periods 
leading up to their crises. Section 4 describes the strong international capital inflows 
into both countries during the pre-crisis periods, and the artificially-low real interest 
rates that these capital inflows generated. Section 5 looks at regulatory imprudence in 
the US and Ireland in the periods leading up to the crises, and how this imprudence 
developed in response to domestic political pressures. Section 6 looks at moral hazard 
behaviour by economic agents in the two countries, and discusses how this 
contributed to each crisis. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Differences between the US and Irish Crises 
 
We begin by reviewing some key events in each of the two crises.2 The US crisis was 
the first to emerge. The slowdown in real estate prices and the consequent downturn 
experienced after 2006 led to uncertainty in the value of the mortgage pass-throughs 
and related securities. Investors became increasingly concerned about the valuation of 
these pooled and tranched products. As most risk models used inputs that were 
estimated during a period of appreciating property prices and favourable economic 
conditions, they under-estimated the true risk of the securitized assets in the face of a 
common shock. Coval, Jubek and Stafford (2008) argue that a neglected feature of the 
securitization process is that it substitutes risks that are largely diversifiable for risks 
that are highly systematic. 
 
Downward pressure in asset values and credit quality led to a decrease in tranche 
prices. Consequently, the rating agencies were forced to downgrade many of the 
mortgage-backed securities, often by several notches. For example, Craig, Smith and 
Ng (2008) report that 90% of the CDO tranches underwritten by Merrill Lynch were 
downgraded from AAA-rated to ‘junk’. These downgrades compounded the problems 
in the market as institutional investors with ratings-based mandates were compelled to 
sell off these assets in extremely thin markets. This further compounded the 
downward spiral in tranche prices. 
 
                                                 
2 Brunnermeier (2009) provides a more comprehensive review of the US crisis. 
4 
Dwyer and Tkac (2009) estimate that global equity and government bond markets are 
approximately 100 times larger than the subprime mortgage-backed asset market. 
Given that the subprime mortgage market is relatively small in global terms the 
degree to which it transmitted across different markets and countries is somewhat 
surprising. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model how adverse shocks in one 
market can be transmitted throughout the financial system. In the case of the US crisis, 
three key markets were affected. One, the mortgage pass-through market, two, the 
credit derivatives market and in particular credit derivatives related to underlying 
mortgage assets, and three, related financing markets including the repo market. Many 
of the mortgage securities were purchased by conduits, Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIV) and other types of funds. These funds financed their purchases by 
issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). This resulted in an increasing degree 
of leverage underpinning the mortgage securities markets. 
 
The negative sentiment toward subprime mortgage assets spilled over into markets for 
other structured debt also. Initial liquidity shortages were exacerbated by a lack of 
appetite on the part of investors for commercial paper even if backed by assets other 
than mortgages. This caused the transmission of the crisis from institutions that were 
directly exposed to the US subprime market to those that relied on short-term 
financing to fund their operations. Many funds were forced to call on the contingent 
liquidity lines provided by their bank sponsor. This put further pressure on bank 
liquidity. As the bad news continued to flow, concern grew about the solvency of 
some market participants. Counterparty credit concerns caused banks to hoard liquid 
assets. Market liquidity evaporated and prices for all but the most liquid securities 
dipped. Libor rose substantially as banks were unwilling to lend to one another.  
 
The US crisis emerged from a mis-understanding of the liquidity and credit risks 
associated with an abundance of complex, relatively new financial products. The US 
crisis also precipitated a global liquidity crisis.  
 
While the emergence of the US crisis was evident from mid-2007 as mortgage 
defaults began to gather pace, the Irish crisis did not manifest itself until a year later. 
In common with many countries (see Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009), Ireland did not feel the 
full force of the turmoil until the collapse of Lehman Brothers sent shock waves 
through international financial markets. The drying up of liquidity exposed the 
fragility of the Irish financial sector. This vulnerability arose from a banking sector 
that had become hugely over-exposed on the asset side to the domestic property and 
construction sector, and on the liability side to interbank Euro borrowing markets; see 
Kelly (2009). 
 
The global liquidity crisis following the Lehman Brothers collapse had severe 
repercussions for Irish financial institutions, who found it difficult to roll over their 
enormous foreign borrowings. Their problems were compounded by the rapidly 
deteriorating credit quality of their loan books, due to adverse conditions in the 
domestic property market. Falling housing and office demand and lower sales prices 
combined to increase the default rate of property developers on loans. Irish financial 
institutions came to the brink of extinction as many of their loans became impaired 
and significant write-downs became unavoidable.  
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The full extent of the crisis in Ireland was brought into sharp focus in late September 
2008 when, only days after the Irish financial regulator had publicly assured investors 
as to the solidity of Irish banks, the Irish government had to step in and guarantee the 
deposits and debts of the six largest financial institutions. The guarantee covered all 
retail and corporate deposits, interbank deposits, covered bonds, senior unsecured 
debt and dated subordinated debt. Although only one bank (reputedly Anglo Irish) 
was clearly unable to refinance its short-term liabilities at that date, the government 
feared a systemic contagion if the one bank was forced into liquidation. The 
government took drastic action to stop such a scenario.  
 
It is not clear that Anglo Irish Bank represented a systemic risk. Anglo Irish Bank had 
a limited retail presence; it operated by making large-scale commercial loans funded 
by institutional borrowing. Other banks may have wanted Anglo Irish included in the 
government support schemes since, as was subsequently revealed, many developer 
loans with different banks were secured with the same collateral, creating a complex 
web that would be difficult and costly to unwind if Anglo Irish alone were allowed to 
fail.  
 
The blanket liability guarantee of all domestic banks created a contingent liability for 
the state of approximately 200% of GDP. Irish creditworthiness on international 
financial markets was dealt a massive blow. The five-year credit default spread on 
Irish government debt (i.e. the cost of insuring against a default) increased by over 
300 basis points between September 2008 and January 2009. Furthermore, the blanket 
guarantee created political tensions for Ireland as many of her European neighbours 
were unhappy with Ireland’s unilateral action. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) report that 
such liability guarantee programmes tend to send mixed signals to market participants 
and raise fears about the health of the international financial system.  
 
As well as the blanket guarantee, the government also promised to recapitalize the 
banks if and when it was deemed necessary. Initially, the major banks expressed 
confidence that this course of action would not be required. Speaking at the 
Oireachtas3 Committee on Finance and the Public Service, Donal Forde, managing 
director of AIB, said: "We are not all the same. AIB has made it clear we don't feel 
we need capital". However, this optimism was proved to be misplaced when in 
January 2009, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish banks received capital injections of 
€3.5 billion each. Even a capital injection could not save Anglo Irish bank, which had 
to be nationalized. 
 
An obvious big difference between the US and Irish crises is the troubled assets 
behind them. The US 2007-8 credit-liquidity crisis followed a period of rapid 
financial innovation, during which many complex new products were introduced. The 
true aggregate risk profile of several technically complex, interlinked US financial 
markets were not properly understood by regulators and participants, precipitating a 
credit-liquidity crisis. In contrast, the Irish crisis evolved from a traditional credit 
boom and bust. Irish domestic financial institutions availed of cheap short-term funds 
using Euro-denominated bonds and interbank borrowing from Euro-area banks. The 
Irish banks used these funds to extend excessive credit to domestic property 
developers. Irish banks’ loan books were also poorly diversified, with an over-
                                                 
3 Oireachtas is the Irish term for parliament. 
6 
concentration on speculative development loans in an over-heated Irish property 
market, while their liabilities included a large proportion of “hot money” interbank 
deposits. These features made the Irish banks extremely vulnerable to the global 
liquidity crisis.  
 
Irish domestic banks were not involved in financial securitisation to any great extent. 
At the time of the crisis, Irish banks had not yet adopted the ‘originate and distribute’ 
model for mortgage financing which was dominant in the US. Irish banks still 
overwhelming employed the more traditional ‘originate and hold’ model. 
Approximately 75% of all bank loans were held on-balance sheet and consequently 
the credit risk remained with the originating bank. Unlike in Germany and Japan, Irish 
financial institutions also did not have any significant exposure to US-based 
mortgages or other US-based securitized assets in their investment portfolios.  
A related difference between the two crises was that the subprime mortgage market 
was in its infancy in Ireland when the US crisis hit. Although mortgage quality had 
declined in Ireland during the latter part of the Irish credit boom, the relative credit 
quality of most new mortgages was still relatively high by contemporary US standards. 
 
3. Irrational Exuberance 
 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) make clear, the causal factors behind financial crises 
typically lie in the boom periods preceding them. Irrational exuberance is a term 
popularized by Greenspan (1996) and Shiller (2005); it refers to the behavioural 
anomaly of intermittent periods of aggregate over-confidence and over-optimism in 
security markets. Irrational exuberance, leading to over-inflated asset prices and 
excessive aggregate risk-taking, is a clear common feature of the both the US and 
Irish crises. This common feature is quite similar between the two crises. 
 
US financial markets were relatively tranquil during the early years of this century. 
Also, the speed with which they recovered from adverse shocks, such as the collapse 
of the dot.com bubble, served to imbue a feeling of invincibility among market 
participants. Furthermore, the bailout to the US financial system in the wake of the 
LTCM collapse (see Lowenstein, 2000) served to reinforce the belief that certain 
participants were ‘too big to fail’ and would receive government support if trouble 
flared. US financial institutions proceeded to pursue riskier strategies in the search for 
higher yield and from 2002 to 2007 they were largely successful. Financial services 
industry common stocks enjoyed large returns in both the US and Ireland. 
 
Figure 1 presents the cumulative increase in the market-wide equity indices in the US 
and Ireland from 1995-2009. Clearly, stock markets in both countries enjoyed a 
sustained period of success up to 2007. However, these gains were not uniformly 
distributed across all sectors, with the financial sector in both countries out-
performing the rest of the domestic market. This is captured in Figure 2, which shows 
the relative performance of the financial sector to the total domestic market for both 
the US and Ireland. In both countries, financial stock prices grew rapidly relative to 
the total market index until the present crisis began to unfold. The Irish financial 
sector increased in value about three times more than other domestic stocks, 
compared to about 1.5 times in the USA. This period of sustained price increases 
contributed to the mood of irrational exuberance in market participants in both 
jurisdictions.  
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Figure 1: US and Irish Total Market Price Indices 
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Figure 2: Performance of the US and Irish financial services sector indices relative to 
their national market equity indices 
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In Ireland, the over-confidence was generated by a sustained period of economic 
growth, leading Ireland to be internationally acclaimed as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Over the 
period 1994 – 2006, the Irish economy grew rapidly with an average annual growth 
rate of approximately 7% and unemployment fell to around 4% (near full 
employment). Ireland began to experience net inward migration; the population 
increased by about 20% to 4.2 million. The economic boom and the subsequent ‘feel-
good factor’ that it generated contributed to a period of irrational exuberance among 
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many players in the financial and property markets. This was the explanation offered 
to angry shareholders by AIB chairman, Dermot Gleeson, in May 2009: 
 
“We drank too deeply from the national cup of, I suppose, confidence … The 
national mood of self-confidence brewed itself up into overdrive.” 
 
One effect of this irrational exuberance was a sustained period of real estate price 
appreciation in both Ireland and the US. In Ireland, residential and commercial 
property experienced huge price increases. Figure 3 shows average residential house 
prices from 1970 to the present. Figure shows that this increase was large even by 
international standards. We present house price indices for Ireland versus those for 
California, New York and the whole US market from 1996 - 2009. It is clear that Irish 
house price appreciation was rapid and excessive even compared to regions which 
were also experiencing a property boom.4  
 
For the US, many commentators have noted (e.g., Gorton (2008)) that the subprime 
mortgage market was fundamentally built on the assumption of ongoing house price 
increases. A typical subprime mortgage was structured to refinance after a two- or 
three-year period. Such refinancing was only possible if the house price had increased. 
In this way the irrational exuberance generating excessive mortgage lending fed upon 
itself, since the growth of mortgage lending increased housing prices, justifying the 
assumption of further house price growth.  
 
 
Figure 3: Irish House Prices – 1970-2009 
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4 These are nominal price indices; we do not have data on California-only or New-York-only inflation 
rates and in any case they would only serve to distort the picture, analogously, correcting for Irish-only 
inflation within the Eurozone is inappropriate.  The US national inflation rate and Eurozone inflation 
rate (not shown) are both low over the time period. 
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Figure 4: Irish vs US House Prices – 1996-2009 
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It is interesting to note that the property price boom in the US seems mild (or 
nonexistent) by Irish standards. From May 1996 until the current peak of US house 
prices in May 2007, average US house prices doubled. This same percentage increase 
occurred in Ireland in the much shorter period from May 1996 until May 2000. One 
can make a convincing case that this late-1990s house price doubling in Ireland was 
not a property bubble, rather, it represented a rational revaluation of Ireland’s housing 
stock.5 What allows us to treat the same percentage increase in average US house 
prices over a much longer time period as a “housing bubble”? The sobering answer is 
that the US “housing bubble” is defined to some extent ex-post by the subsequent 
occurrence of the crisis. 
 
The Irish housing boom began as a rational response to increasing demand. Ireland 
experienced net inward migration, and there also was a desire by the indigenous 
population to upgrade the existing housing stock in response to increasing per-capita 
income levels. During the early part of the Celtic Tiger period, increases in supply 
(see Figure ) were unable to match this demand and hence prices began to increase 
sharply. This price trend was exacerbated during the later years from 2000-2006 when 
over-aggressive bank lending flooded the market with property developers and 
speculative investors; see Kelly (2009).  
 
                                                 
5 For example, Kelly (2009) differentiates between the real-efficiency-based Irish growth phase of the 
late 1990s and the Irish property and construction bubble of the early 2000’s.  Although he does not 
provide an explicit turning point, Kelly makes a convincing case that the second, subsequent doubling 
of house prices in Ireland (from 2000 to 2006) was a credit-fuelled price bubble. 
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Figure 5: Irish House Completions – 1970-2008 
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In summary, it is clear with hindsight that both the US and Ireland experienced bouts 
of irrational exuberance in the periods prior to their crises (additional evidence will be 
presented in the following sections).  Asset price increases, for housing indices, 
national equity market indices, and financial services sector sub-indices, are 
substantially more extreme in the case Ireland; in the case of the US the evidence for 
asset pricing bubbles, as opposed to irrational exuberance in the form of excessive 
risk-taking, is somewhat less compelling. 
 
4. Capital Flow Bonanza 
 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), a common feature in banking crises is a 
sustained surge in capital inflows in the run-up period before the crisis. Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2008a) call this a capital flow bonanza and we follow their terminology. 
They show that the probability of a banking crisis conditional on a capital flow 
bonanza in the preceding period is substantially higher than the unconditional 
probability. The US and Irish crises share the common feature of a capital flow 
bonanza in the periods prior to their credit crises. However, it is notable that this 
capital bonanza took quite different forms in the two cases.  
 
In the US, large current account deficits throughout the run-up period were offset by 
large capital account surpluses, with foreign funds flowing into US government debt 
securities and into mortgage-based securitized assets. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008b) 
show that countries experiencing banking crises tend to have large, sustained current 
account deficits during the pre-crisis run-up period. The U.S. had this experience in 
the period prior to the crisis. 
 
In the case of Ireland, the capital bonanza was mediated by the Irish commercial 
banks. In 1999, Irish banks were funded primarily from domestic sources; see Table 1. 
By 2008, Irish customer deposits provided just 22% of domestic bank funding. Over 
37% of the funding was obtained in the form of deposits and securities from the 
international capital markets. Directly in response to this capital inflow, the balance 
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sheets of the Irish banks increased more than six-fold in the period 1999 to 2008. 
Lending to the non-financial private sector had grown to more than 200% of GDP by 
end of the period, approximately twice the European average (see Figure ). 
 
 
Table 1: Composition of Irish Banking Liabilities, 1999 and 2008 
Dec-99 Dec-08 Dec-99 Dec-08
Deposits from non-Irish credit institutions 15,542 149,465 19.8% 29.1%
Irish customer deposits 35,142 114,235 44.8% 22.2%
Deposits from Irish credit institutions 6,472 87,196 8.2% 17.0%
Other liabilities 9,671 57,227 12.3% 11.1%
Debt securities - non-Irish 71 43,574 0.1% 8.5%
Non-Irish customer deposits 4,336 23,415 5.5% 4.6%
Debt securities to Irish residents 241 19,092 0.3% 3.7%
Capital and reserves 6,990 19,746 8.9% 3.8%
78,465 513,950 100.0% 100.0%  
Source: Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland. Table C4, Quarterly 
Bulletin 
 
 
Figure 6: Composition of Irish Banking Liabilities, 1999 and 2008 
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Intimately related to the capital bonanza in the US was an unusually low real rate of 
interest and low risk-adjusted required rates on risky investments. US monetary policy 
was notably accommodative during the US crisis build-up period; Taylor (2008) 
argues that this was the main causal factor in the US crisis.  
 
A significant factor in the creation of the Irish property bubble was the relatively low 
interest rates following Ireland admission to the Euro currency union. The effect of 
the reduction in nominal interest rates was further compounded by Ireland’s high 
economic growth over the period from 1995-2005. This sustained period of growth 
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far outstripped its larger European neighbours. Consequently, with nominal rates set 
to cater for the entire Euro zone, Ireland had great difficulty reining in its inflation, 
leading to a period of very low and sometimes negative, real interest rates. The ECB 
policy rate was less than Irish inflation rate for most of the ten years prior to the crisis; 
(see Figure ).  
 
Figure 7: Irish Inflation Rate and ECB Policy Rate: 1999-2009 
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After Ireland’s entry to the Euro zone, Irish banks funded much of their lending with 
short-term foreign borrowing. This allowed Irish financial institutions to extend much 
larger volumes of credit to borrowers at lower cost, as evidenced by Figure . As a 
small member of the Eurozone, Ireland does not have control of its interest rates, but 
Figure 8 shows an Irish target rate calculated from a standard Taylor rule. We set the 
target rate equal to 1/2 (GDP growth rate - 3%) + 1/2 (inflation rate - 2%) + 1%.  Had 
Eurozone interest rates been set in accordance with a Taylor rule for Ireland, the 
interest rate would have been almost 6% higher on average during the period, and up 
to 12% higher in 2000.  
 
In addition to the distortionary effect of too-low interest rates, there was also the large 
flow of credit into Ireland associated with this distortion. Kelly (2009) argues that this 
enormous inflow of credit into Ireland, rather than the low level of interest rates, 
better explains the housing and construction bubble. As we discuss in the next section, 
and as noted by Kelly (2009) and Honohan (2009), there was a lack of regulatory or 
central bank action to stem this dangerous international credit inflow. 
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Figure 8: Taylor Rule Rates for Ireland and ECB Policy Rate: 1999-2009 
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5. Regulatory Imprudence 
 
An important common feature of the two crises was regulatory imprudence. In both 
countries, policymakers and regulators allowed the risk profiles of their financial 
services sectors to evolve in very dangerous ways, influenced by strong domestic 
political pressures. Interestingly, the nature of the political pressures that swayed 
policymakers in the two countries was quite different, and the detailed nature of the 
policy and regulatory errors was also quite different. 
 
The seeds of the U.S. crisis lie in the subprime mortgage market. It is important for 
comparative purposes to note that this market is almost uniquely American. The 
subprime mortgage market serves a politically important role in U.S. housing policy. 
In effect, it supplements or replaces the burdensome government expenditures on 
social-housing programmes that are common in other developed nations (including 
Ireland). During the Bush administration, the social goal of broadening home 
ownership through subprime lending was very successful. In March 2000, Fannie 
Mae announced its American Dream Commitment: an aggressive corporate strategy to 
purchase $2 trillion in mortgage loans for poor and minority households over the 
following ten years. The period 2000-2007 saw a strong trajectory toward meeting 
this target. Home ownership in the US grew from 64% in 2004, where it had been for 
almost two decades, to 69% in 2007, a spectacular increase of 5% in five years, with 
particularly high rates of increase among Blacks and Hispanics. From the perspective 
of increasing homeownership as a political and regulatory goal, the pre-crisis period 
was an outstandingly successful period. However, to quote Shiller (2010):  
 
“Encouraging homeownership is a worthy and admirable national goal. It conveys a 
sense of participation and belonging, and high homeownership rates are beneficial to 
a healthy society. … But the subprime housing dilemma in the United States points up 
14 
problems with over-promoting homeownership. Homeownership, for all its 
advantages, is not the ideal housing arrangement for all people in all circumstances. 
And we are now coming to appreciate the reality of this …” 
 
Analysts now accept that during the pre-crisis period the securitized mortgage market 
grew excessively. This excessive growth can be traced, at least in part, to political 
pressures (Issa, 2009). Many subprime borrowers had poor credit histories and 
undocumented income. They lacked the two essential ingredients normally demanded 
of borrowers: a substantial down payment and a verifiable source of steady income to 
meet the ongoing repayments. 
 
Securitized subprime mortgages represented an entirely free-market solution to a 
social problem. Securitization was viewed as a positive development which gave the 
benefits of credit risk diversification and the expansion of trading opportunities. The 
consequent increase in moral hazard problems (discussed in the next section) was 
downplayed or ignored. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) refer to the “this time is 
different” cognitive error, in which economic agents convince themselves that new 
technologies have eliminated traditional sources of financial risk.  This type of 
cognitive error was clearly a feature in regulatory and managerial responses to the 
enormous growth in mortgage-related securities markets during the early years of the 
new century. With hindsight, the diversification benefits seem to have been 
exaggerated due to the similarity of the securitised products and the credit and 
liquidity risks arising from cross-holdings of assets by large financial institutions. 
Many of these products were so complex, that much of the cross-holdings may have 
arisen not by construction but inadvertently. Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) show that 
high correlations may arise through interlinkages which are not at first apparent to the 
market due to their complexity.  
 
In the US, in addition to political pressure to increase homeownership, there was 
purely self-interested lobbying by business interests involved in the lucrative 
mortgage securitization process and in mortgage-security-related trading. Igan, 
Mishra and Tressel (2009) find evidence of attempts at regulatory capture in the U.S. 
They find that the lenders who lobbied most intensively on specific issues related to 
mortgage lending were those who originated mortgages with higher loan-to-value 
ratios, securitised a faster growing proportion of their loans and had faster-growing 
loan portfolios. They suggest that lobbying was linked to lenders expecting special 
treatments from policymakers, allowing them to engage in riskier lending behaviour. 
They further suggest that lending behaviour was affected by the politics of special 
interest groups. Dell’Aricia, Igan and Laeven (2009) present evidence that lending 
standards declined in regions where the credit boom was larger, that lower regional 
lending standards were associated with a faster rate of house price appreciation, and 
lending standards declined more in regions where new competitors entered the market 
and where a larger proportion of loans was securitized. 
 
In Ireland as in the USA, political pressures skewed the financial regulatory setting, 
but in very different ways.  Starting in the early 1990s, the Irish government made a 
strategic decision to become a world-leader in “offshore” financial services. For 
foreign financial services firms willing to set up operations in Ireland, the main 
attractions were an educated, English-speaking workforce, a Western European 
location, and light-touch, almost nonexistent, tax and regulatory oversight. This very 
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lax supervisory regime led The New York Times to call Ireland “the wild west of 
European finance.”6   
  
An unintended consequence of the extremely light-touch financial regulatory regime 
in Ireland was to hobble Irish regulators in their oversight of domestic banks.  The 
actions of the Irish financial regulator are secretive with limited public disclosure.  In 
a recent appearance before the Irish parliament, the newly appointed head of the Irish 
Central Bank called for an official investigation into bank regulation during the 
bubble period, modelled on the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. At present, 
most of what is known was revealed inadvertently or through leaks to the media. Ross 
(2009) conducts an investigative study and argues that the regulatory regime for 
domestic Irish banks during the pre-crisis period was extremely weak and ineffective. 
As Ross recounts, the only aggressive actions of the Irish financial regulator seemed 
to be directed at media leaks; its relationship with the financial services sector was 
very accommodating and compliant.  For example, for eight years, the board 
chairman and other directors at Anglo Irish Bank hid very large personal loans by 
temporarily transferring them just prior to accounting year-end to other banks 
complicit in the scheme, and then by pre-agreement rolling the loans back into Anglo 
Irish immediately after the publication of the annual accounts.  It is not yet clear7 
whether the regulator approved, ignored, or missed this subterfuge, but no regulatory 
action was or has been taken. Also, Anglo Irish Bank deliberately understated its 
loans-to-deposits ratio through sham transactions – this took the form of agreed 
interbank lending by Anglo to another Irish domestic bank just before reporting year-
end, and then immediately accepting the funds back from the other bank as “customer 
savings deposits.” In this case there is considerable evidence (obtained via media 
leaks) that the Irish financial regulator informally approved of the stratagem.8  In 
2007, Anglo Irish became aware that a large shareholder was preparing to sell a 10% 
position in Anglo Irish shares. To prevent this share sale from impacting its share 
market price, Anglo senior management organized a secret circle of ten wealthy bank 
clients, lent each of them €30 million for the purchase of Anglo shares, with limited 
recourse on the loans beyond for the purchased shares as collateral.  Since the loans 
were without recourse to the borrowers, Anglo was the at-risk investor in the shares, 
and was essentially using €300 million of its depositors’ funds to secretly purchase its 
own equity shares. Again, there have been no prosecutions, and there is (disputed) 
evidence that the financial regulator was at least dimly aware of this share 
manipulation scheme.9  
 
In addition to ignoring, or even condoning, fraudulent accounting, the financial 
regulator and Irish central bank made strategic errors in not responding to the build-up 
of systemic risk to the banking system. Honohan (2009) provides a careful analysis of 
the major policy errors by the Irish financial regulator and Irish central bank during 
the pre-crisis period. He notes that rapid balance sheet growth of financial institutions 
– usually interpreted as growth of more than 20% per annum in any year - is a basic 
warning sign used by financial regulators. The balance sheets of Anglo and Irish 
Nationwide expanded by an average of 36% and 20% per year over the ten-year 
period from 1998 to 2007. Honohan argues that, using standard procedures, the Irish 
                                                 
6 Lavery and O’Brien (2005). 
7 See Weston (2009). 
8 See Lord (2009). 
9 See O’Brien, Ryan and Rogers (2009) and Oliver (2009). 
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financial regulator should have acted on the systemic risk generated by these 
extremely high balance-sheet growth rates. Furthermore, the overly-concentrated 
focus of the banking sectors’ lending activities on property development should have 
been acted upon. In addition to inadequately responding to system-wide distortions, 
the Irish regulator overlooked obvious distortions in the risk profiles of individual 
banks. For example, Irish Nationwide is a building society established to provide 
mortgages to its members. Yet it was allowed by the regulator to put its members’ 
funds at risk by lending 80% of its funds to a small number of property developers. 
By 2006, only a small proportion of its loan book consisted of retail mortgages; 
although providing these retail mortgages was its purported institutional mission. 
 
The dramatic growth in lending to the Irish residential property sector was fuelled 
partly by looser lending criteria. As Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide pursued 
very aggressive lending policies, more traditional banks responded by being more 
accommodating to potential borrowers. Increasing rivalry between institutions for 
market share is cited as a reason for the parallel decline in standards; see Honohan 
(2009).  
 
Although the major sources of systemic risk were the overuse of interbank borrowing 
and the over-concentration on very risky property development loans, the credit 
quality of new residential mortgages in Ireland also declined substantially during the 
run-up period. Figure 9 shows that more mortgages were for higher loan-to-value; the 
percentage of mortgages for greater than 95% of the property value increased from 
6% to 16% in the period 2004 to 2007. Likewise, Figure 10 shows that the maturity of 
the mortgages lengthened, with the percentage of loans with a maturity of greater than 
30 years jumping from 10% to 35% in the period 2004 to 2007. 
 
Figure 9: Composition of Irish Mortgages by Loan-to-Value: 2004-2007 
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Figure 10: Composition of Irish Mortgages by Loan Maturity: 2004-2007 
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Woods (2007) reports that, as a proportion of lending to the private sector, property-
related lending grew from 38% in 2001 to over 62% in 2007. With the enormous 
growth in property- and construction-related lending, the loan books of the Irish 
domestic banks were becoming increasingly undiversified. While prices continued to 
surge in the commercial property market up to 2006, rental income did not follow suit. 
This resulted in low income yields in Ireland relative to European neighbours. 
Consequently, investors in this sector were relying heavily on capital gains for their 
prospective returns. 
 
Another source of regulatory imprudence in Ireland was the long and close 
relationship between the Fianna Fáil political party (the dominant party in coalition 
governments during most of the pre-crisis period) and the Irish property development 
industry; see MacDonald and Sheridan (2008) for a detailed discussion. Also, the 
public exchequer was becoming ever more reliant on taxes from this sector. The tax 
take from stamp duty on the purchase of property was, at the peak of house prices in 
2006, accounting for about 17% of all tax revenues. When one adds on the income tax 
paid by construction workers and VAT collected on property sales, the industry was 
contributing about one-fifth of all government tax revenue. The government did not 
have the political will to dampen the sector.  
 
In addition to the enormous credit inflow, the over-heating of the property markets 
was exacerbated by government legislation that encouraged people to invest in 
property through a series of tax-incentive schemes. For example, generous tax relief 
was available to investors in hotels as the government sought to increase the stock of 
hotel rooms and hence tourism; similar breaks were available to individuals who built 
houses in seaside towns and in rural areas. The stated aim of these programmes was to 
instigate ‘rural re-generation’, but there is little available evidence that they delivered 
sustainable benefits to the sparsely populated regions earmarked by the programmes. 
Following the crisis, Ireland struggles with an enormous glut of hotel rooms and 
newly-built, vacant rural housing. 
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As fears for the health of domestic banking systems gripped many countries, the Irish 
sector was initially quite bullish about their ability to remain outside of the turmoil. 
The chief financial regulator, Patrick Neary, assured concerned parties in September 
2008 that it is “…important to point out that Irish banks have only very limited 
exposures to US subprime losses and related credit products.” While this statement 
was true, it missed the Irish economy’s over-dependence on a domestic property 
market bubble. He went on to say “Irish banks are resilient and have good shock 
absorption capacity to cope with the current situation.” 
As mentioned above, considerable decline in lending standards occurred in the Irish 
mortgage market; an increasing proportion of lending was done at higher loan-to-
value, higher income multiples, longer maturities, and with interest-only periods. The 
only step the regulator took to stem the sharp decline in lending standards was to 
increase to 100% the risk-weighting on the portion of a residential mortgage written 
above an 80% loan-to-value threshold. As Honohan (2009) notes, this was a weak and 
ineffective response. 
 
In summary, regulators and policymakers in both countries made erroneous decisions 
in response to political pressures. The specific nature of the errors, and the types of 
pernicious political influences, differ substantially in the two cases. Another notable 
distinction is in the nature of the regulatory policy errors in the two jurisdictions.  US 
regulators (along with a substantial proportion of the economics research community) 
failed to appreciate the dangerous fragility of the extremely complex interactions 
linking several technically sophisticated US financial markets. The economic research 
community is now building theoretical models which explain the ensuing credit-
liquidity gridlock. In contrast, in Ireland, the regulatory mistakes were simple 
misjudgements, obviously flawed relative to standard regulatory procedures widely 
available at the time. 
 
6. Moral Hazard 
 
Moral hazard occurs when an agent has an incentive to take economically inefficient 
actions because the agent is insulated from the risky consequences of his behaviour. 
Moral hazard problems played a big role in both the US and Irish crises, but in quite 
different forms.   
 
As discussed in Section 2, the US credit-liquidity crisis had its origin in a large 
increase in the stock of poor- quality mortgages in the USA during 2000-2006. This 
unsustainable increase in low-credit-quality mortgages can be traced back, at least in 
part, to the severe moral hazard problems in the originate-and-distribute mortgage 
generation system dominant in US banking. Under this system, mortgage originators 
sell mortgage loan assets on to other parties who then securitize them and re-sell them 
in packaged form. Mortgage originators have little or no incentive to monitor credit 
quality of individual mortgages or to rigorously enforce purported credit standards. 
Dell’Arricia, Igan and Laevan (2009) demonstrate convincingly that this moral hazard 
problem contributed to the decline in mortgage credit quality in the US during 2000 – 
2006. They show that the relative credit quality decline during this period was highest 
in regions with the highest proportion of securitized mortgages (op. cit. Section V.F, 
Table 12). Rajan, Siru and Vig (2008) show that as the percentage of securitized loans 
increased in regional areas, loan originators created a bias in the perceived credit 
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quality by substituting “hard” credit information on borrowers (information which 
could be documented and used in the securitization process) at the expense of “soft” 
information about the true credit quality of individual borrowers. In a related paper, 
Keys, Mukherjee, Siru and Vig (2008) show that loan originator laxness in screening 
mortgage applicant credit quality is directly related to the probability that a given loan 
will be securitized. See also Diamond and Rajan (2008) on the importance of the 
mortgage credit quality decline, caused by the originate-and-distribute lending system, 
as a causal factor in the ensuing US credit-liquidity crisis. Despite its centrality to the 
US crisis, this particular moral hazard problem has no relevance to the Irish credit 
crisis. Throughout the bubble period Irish banks used the originate-and-hold lending 
system, for both residential mortgage and business lending. Almost all the loans that 
the Irish banks generated remained on their own balance sheets. This crucial 
component of the US crisis is virtually absent in the Irish case. 
 
The moral hazard problem associated with performance-related pay in the financial 
services industry was another key driver of the US crisis. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein 
(2008) note that the imperfections linking management true performance and long-run 
share value mean that managers are over-incentivized to hold “tail risk” – essentially, 
traders are incentivized to have a portfolio or trading strategy earning a reliable 
stream of modest insurance-premium-like income in exchange for accepting (on 
behalf of their firm) a small-probability risk of a very large loss. If, during the career 
of a trader, a tail event is realized, he/she can exercise his/her “trader put option” and 
resign from the firm (or be fired), leaving firm shareholders to cover the large loss. 
This type of tail risk is exactly the structure of return payoff generated by the 
mortgage-related securitized assets and credit derivatives common in the originate-
and-distribute system in the USA. Franke and Krahnen (2008) argue that misaligned 
incentives in financial-management compensation, along with the moral hazard 
problem in the originate-and-distribute loan generation system, were the two basic 
underlying causes of the US crisis. Brunnermeir (2009) shows that the incentive for 
excessive risk-taking by investment managers is worsened in a low-interest-rate 
environment. Unusually low interest rates characterized the pre-crisis periods in both 
countries. On a separate but related point, Agarwal and Wang (2009) show that 
performance-related compensation for middle managers in the US mortgage-
generation industry also contributed to the decline in average credit quality.  
 
The moral hazard problem associated with performance-related compensation in 
financial services also has relevance in the Irish case. As discussed earlier, Irish banks 
borrowed cheaply in the interbank Euro market and invested these borrowed funds in 
loans to domestic property developers. On the one hand, the risk-return distribution of 
this very risky strategy does not have the classic “tail risk” pattern of securitized 
mortgage assets and related credit derivatives. On the other hand, when the strategy 
went badly wrong, the “trader put option” was successfully exercised by many senior 
executives in the Irish domestic banks. Recall from section 2 above that there were 
two rogue institutions, Anglo-Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society, who 
stoked the fires of the bubble with particularly reckless lending practices. Each of 
these institutions was controlled by a single, powerful and long-standing chief. When 
the magnitude of the bad loans at the two institutions became clear, along with a host 
of accounting and share trading irregularities, both of these bank heads were forced 
into retirement. Both of the two rogue-bank heads retired with their large fortunes 
intact, and there is little or any hope of financial recourse by taxpayers or others.  
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Of course, both the US poor-credit mortgages and Irish risky property development 
loans involved conscious decisions by borrowers as well as lenders. In the case of 
poor-credit-quality US mortgages the borrowers were individual households with 
relatively low incomes; they might arguably be treated as an exploited group, 
encouraged by over-aggressive mortgage originators into making bad borrowing 
decisions. The property loans issued by Irish banks were obtained by wealthy 
property developers, arguably well-informed, rational actors with considerable 
business acumen. It is not clear whether a moral hazard argument can explain their 
behaviour. Personal guarantees were a standard component of property development 
loan contracts in Ireland during the bubble period, so most of these developers did not 
have recourse to the trader put option. Irish property developers are legally liable for 
the “tail risk” in the net value of these loans, including de jure claims against their 
personal assets.   
 
This brings us to another potential source of moral hazard: weak law enforcement. 
This was likely an important source of moral hazard in the Irish case. The legal 
framework for personal bankruptcy in Ireland is antiquated and rarely activated. 
Although property developers signed de jure claims against their personal assets as 
part of their bank loan contracts, many commentators believe that these claims are de 
facto unenforceable in Ireland. There is also the concern in Ireland that politically 
powerful agents have the ability to manipulate regulatory and legislative processes to 
their advantages. Most large property developers in Ireland have been very closely 
connected to the ruling political party, Fianna Fáil. Kelly (2009) uses the term “too 
connected to fail” for this feature of the Irish business environment.  
 
With regard to weak law enforcement, the situation in Ireland is dramatically different 
from that in the USA, where corporate, financial regulatory, securities and bankruptcy 
laws are enforced with unusual strictness and severity by international standards. This 
is a distinctive difference between the two crises. 
 
There are other moral hazard problems statistically linked to financial crises which 
may or may not have had some role in the two cases under consideration here. Moral 
hazard problems associated with bank deposit insurance have been exhaustively 
studied. On the one hand, deposit insurance is a powerful tool in preventing bank runs. 
On the other hand, guaranteed liability holders have no incentive to monitor bank 
riskiness or to shift their deposits (or other insured liabilities) away from errant banks. 
This gives banks and other financial institutions a moral hazard incentive to increase 
the riskiness of their balance sheets unduly. Moral hazard behaviour associated with 
deposit insurance is widely assigned a large role in the US savings and loan crisis of 
the early 1980s, e.g., Keeley (1990). It had no obvious role in the more recent US 
crisis. Attention has shifted toward the implicit liability guarantees which will exist 
whenever the ex-post optimal government response to an existing crisis would be to 
insure or save large, ailing financial institutions. Some commentators argue that the 
U.S. government’s decision to step in and save Bear Sterns worsened the magnitude 
of the ensuing crisis since it led other financial services firms to believe that they had 
an implicit bail-out guarantee and could act accordingly, e.g., Cohan (2010). 
 
Did the moral hazard associated with liability-guarantees or bank bailouts have an 
influence on Irish bank behaviour? During the bubble period, Irish banks had access 
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to only limited government-supported deposit insurance. However, the government’s 
first action after the Lehman Brothers collapse was to institute with immediate effect 
a government-funded blanket guarantee of all domestic Irish banks’ liabilities. The 
Irish government’s ex-post guarantee even covered equity holders since, as mentioned 
earlier, as the banks’ core equity capital deteriorated, the government supplied equity 
capital directly to the banks. It also set up the National Asset Management Agency 
with the explicit goal of overpaying for banks’ distressed assets, in order to keep the 
privately-owned equity capital in the banks from collapsing in value.  
 
Ex post, Irish domestic banks were blessed with extremely generous bailout policies 
by the government. Was this “implicit guarantee” foreseen by the banks ex-ante, and 
did this affect their behaviour? For the two largest Irish domestic banks, there was 
probably some foresight that if their reckless actions during the bubble period led 
them into trouble, the government would step in and save the institutions. This 
certainly turned out to be the case, and such an outcome seems predictable ex-ante. So 
the “too big to fail” implicit guarantee moral hazard problem seems relevant to the 
Irish crisis, with “too big to fail” recalibrated to the small absolute size of the Irish 
banking system. 
 
In summary, moral hazard problems played a big role in both crises, but in 
surprisingly different forms. The moral hazard problem in the originate-and-distribute 
mortgage system played a central role in setting the stage for the US crisis. This 
market feature was almost entirely absent in Ireland where an originate-and-hold loan 
generation system was dominant. The moral hazard in performance-related-pay had a 
role in both the US and Irish crises. Weak law enforcement was another source of 
moral hazard in Ireland, but this does not apply in the USA where the enforcement of 
corporate and financial regulatory law and personal bankruptcy law is unusually strict 
by international standards. Whether the moral hazard problems associated with 
financial firm bailouts had a role in the two crises is difficult to discern with any 
confidence.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions  
 
The US credit-liquidity crisis of 2007-8 and the Irish credit crisis of 2008-9 are nearly 
contemporary, and also have some causal connections, since reverberations from the 
US crisis precipitated the Irish crisis. Nonetheless, at a superficial level they are 
surprisingly different. This paper explores the similarities and differences between the 
two crises. We identify four broadly-defined common features in the causal 
foundations of the two crises. The four common features are irrational exuberance, 
capital bonanzas, regulatory imprudence, and moral hazard. Looking in more detail at 
each of these four common features, we find that their particular manifestations are 
quite different in the two crises.   
 
This modest two-crisis comparison cries out for more research. Are the four common 
features that we identify present in a broader sample of financial crises in recent 
decades? Are there additional common features that we have missed, or alternative 
taxonomies? We find in our comparison of the US and Irish crises that the 
particularities of the crises are very different.  In a broader sample of crises, is there a 
similar diversity in the specific causal mechanisms generating the crises?   
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